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Abstract 
 
This article seeks to locate social work within late capitalism, drawing on the social 
theories of Zygmunt Bauman to bring some analytical purchase to this discussion . It 
outlines key themes in Bauman’s writing and considers discursive trends in social 
work practice against these. The starting point for Bauman’s work is the shift he 
identifies from what he calls ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity. The implications for social 
work within solid and liquid modern imaginaries are considered. Essentially, 
modernity, in its dominant guises, conceives of social work as a technical-rational 
endeavour whereas Bauman would argue that it is an irredeemably moral one. The 
moral dimension, however, is swept aside by the bureaucracy of solid modernity and 
by the neoliberal precepts of liquid modernity. This creates a growing dissonance 
between the initial ethical impulse that brings people into social work and the job 
they are increasingly expected to do. Bauman argues that an ethical stance that 
involves social workers ‘being-for’ those they work with cannot come about through 
recourse to rules and codes but ultimately relies on workers taking personalised and 
situated moral positions. 
 
 
Keywords 
Bauman, modernity, postmodernity, liquid modernity, social work, bureaucracy, 
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Introduction 
 
Across what Lonne et al (2008) call the Anglophone world and Hugman (2009) the 
‘global North’, questions at the heart of contemporary social work emerge out of the 
tension between personal commitment and managerial accountability, increasingly 
manifest through regulation. To regulate, according to Webb, is ‘to govern and 
control through a set of rule-bound actions or procedures’ (2006: 42). A regulatory 
impulse can feel threatened by but also more necessary within late modern societies, 
with their propensities to generate new forms of risk (Beck, 1992).  Modernity seeks 
to impose order upon the resultant sense of insecurity through ever-more elaborate 
systems to assess, monitor and manage risk. While modernity seeks order, 
postmodernity is governed by the will to individual happiness and a relinquishing of 
the regulatory impulse (Bauman, 1997). A corollary of this, however, is anxiety, 
brought about by sacrificing modernity’s promise of security. The world is 
experienced as overwhelmingly uncertain, uncontrollable and frightening. (Bauman, 
1997) 
 
A central tension arises between what Webb (2006) identifies as these twin 
rationalities of regulation and security (2006: 5). Social work’s ambivalent 
positioning along this axis ‘is manifest through, on the one hand, its instrumental 
rationality, as complicity with calculating and regulatory practices, and on the other 
hand, its substantive rationality in securing personal identity through its dialogic and 
expressive face-work’ (Webb, 2006: 6). Within the neoliberal political and economic 
regimes, which predominate across most of the Anglophone world and encroach more 
widely, regulatory systems have become entrenched to a point where, through a 
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process of governmentality (Rose and Miller, 1992), they assume a taken for granted 
status in the minds of practitioners. But, while generally internalising this perceived 
need for regulation practitioners know, nevertheless, that there is something rotten at 
the heart of much current day social work; the technicist, rule-bound and 
administrative grind of daily practice rarely accords with what most of them came 
into the job to do (Jones, 2001). This can lead to what Bourdieu et al (1999) identify 
as ‘social suffering’ where the gulf between the reality of social workers’ occupations 
and their more deeply held ontological and professional beliefs becomes a source of 
acute personal discomfort.  
 
This dissonance between managerial accountability and personal engagement is 
increasingly identified in the literature (e.g. Jones, 2001, Meagher and Parton, 2004, 
Ruch, 2005, Webb, 2006, Smith and Smith, 2008, Halvorsen, 2009). This article 
draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s social theory to provide some analytical purchase on 
this dissonance. Bauman’s work is beginning to appear on the radar of social work 
writers uneasy with and eager to find alternative ways of concepualising the state of 
the profession (e.g. Abrahamson, 2004, Hugman, 2003a, 2003b, Webb, 2006) and 
more generally within the literature on child welfare (Moss and Petrie, 2002, 
Dahlberg and Moss, 2005). Bauman (2000) has himself spoken and written on social 
work.  
 
Bauman, by his own account, is not a bystander, a dispassionate observer of the 
human condition but one who is engaged and invariably positioned on the side of the 
poor and the dispossessed. True to form he identifies less a dissonance and more a 
fundamental philosophical disjunction between regulation and personal commitment, 
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arguing that ‘when we obscure the essential human and moral aspects of care behind 
ever more rules and regulations we make ‘the daily practice of social work ever more 
distant from its original ethical impulse’ (2000: 9). ‘When concepts, standards and 
rules enter the stage’, he argues, ‘moral impulse makes an exit’ (1993: 61). By this 
reckoning the plethora of rules and regulations that increasingly surround practice are 
not just minor but necessary irritants; they act to dull the moral impulse to care and to 
‘be for’ those we work with. This is a claim that calls into question the entire thrust of 
social work as currently constituted in the UK and across much of the Anglophone 
world, where claims of progress and service improvement and of confident, 
competent workforces are hitched to the wagon of an expanding regulatory apparatus.  
 
In the course of this article I draw on Bauman’s work to interpret discursive shifts in 
the positioning of the profession over time and some of the implications of this. I 
consider the shift Bauman identifies from what he calls ‘solid’ to ‘liquid’ modernity, 
identifying features of how social work is positioned within each. Specifically, I 
address his critique of bureaucracy and its corollaries of social distance and 
ambivalence before moving on to a discussion of his ethics. Bauman’s approach to 
ethics can perhaps only be understood in its connection to the themes that emerge 
from the wider corpus of his work. His is an ethics that has little place for the rule-
bound and codified approaches that are the bedrock of much current social work. 
Instead, they require that ethics be repersonalised and contextualised within the 
inevitable complexities of everyday practice. 
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Bauman’s Life and Work 
 
A Polish Jew, Bauman began his career as a sociologist in Warsaw. From 1971 until 
1990 he held a chair of sociology at The University of Leeds where he remains 
professor emeritus. He started out as a committed Marxist who, over time, came to 
eschew the universalising tendencies of communism as having little to offer an 
increasingly complex world. Beyond this it is hard to categorise Bauman’s work. He 
is prolific and broad ranging, a theorist rather than empiricist, an exponent of the 
sociological imagination par excellence. His move away from Marxism involved a 
postmodern turn in which he railed against the rationalizing tendencies and universal 
ethics of the Enlightenment or at least what became the dominant strands of the 
Enlightenment project (Bauman, 1993). 
 
His location within an oeuvre of the sociological imagination immediately sets 
Bauman at odds with the dominant political direction of social work, which casts the 
profession within increasingly technical-rational paradigms. Indeed, Jones (1996) 
identifies the deliberate intellectual purging of the social work curriculum in the UK 
by the Central Council for Education and Training in Social Work Education 
(CCETSW) over the course of the 1990s. Sociologists were particularly unwelcome 
within a reductionist, competency-based framework. Bauman brings sociological 
perspectives to bear on the profession with some force, providing compelling insights 
into the social world in which social workers ply their trade. The starting point for any 
consideration of Bauman’s work is an exposition of modernity. 
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Modernity and its discontents 
 
Modernity (or at least its dominant guises) imposes a divide between reason and 
emotion. (Submerged although resurgent strands of Enlightenment thought and 
especially perhaps those centred around David Hume and other figures in the Scottish 
Enlightenment knew better and eschewed such a stark divide - see Tronto, 1993). 
Dominant Enlightenment values, however, became based around this 
rational/emotional dualism, foregrounding qualities of positivism, rationalism, 
objectivism, universalism and a desire for order. Postmodernity, by contrast sets aside 
erstwhile certainties valorising constructivism, interpretivism, subjectivism and 
pluralism (Hugman, 2003a). The influence of postmodernism on social work is by 
now fairly well established if not always swallowed whole (Hugman, 2003a).  
Bauman himself took a postmodern turn as is apparent in the title of his book 
‘Postmodern Ethics’ (1993). He later distanced himself from the term postmodernity, 
however, preferring his own concept of liquid modernity. This postulates that we 
remain in a broadly modern epoch but one that is distinguished from the ‘solid’ 
modernity of the post-war welfare consensus with its belief in human progress 
through rational scientific advance by an increased pace of change and fluidity. It is 
according to Blackshaw (2005) solid modernity coming to terms with its 
impossibility. Bauman does, however, hang on to a core tenet of postmodernity in his 
incredulity to grand narratives Lyotard (1984); he recognises the contingent and 
ambivalent nature of the world.  
 
Bauman’s work came to wide public prominence in ‘Modernity and the Holocaust’ 
(1989) in which he argued that modernity’s quest to impose order and to eradicate 
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ambivalence culminated in the Holocaust and, although less explicitly articulated, in 
the gulags. The Holocaust was not an aberration, a blip in modernity’s path of 
inexorable progress, but a defining and perhaps inevitable feature of its totalising 
instincts. He developed some of these arguments in ‘Postmodern Ethics’ (1993) and 
still further in ‘Life in Fragments’ (1995). He then turned his attention to an analysis 
of some of the major social features of modernity. Foremost among these is 
globalisation addressed in a book of the same name (Bauman, 1998). Globalisation is 
characterised by movement; global travel and communication technologies have 
changed the meaning of distance. But, as the strapline of this book suggests, 
globalisation has human consequences. Rather than bringing societies closer together 
it actually polarises them, creating categories of tourists and vagabonds. Tourists 
move around because they want to; vagabonds, the homeless, the refugees and 
immigrants, because they have to. Movement is their only commonality; otherwise 
they occupy different spaces. Indeed tourists’ persistent fear of slipping into 
vagabondage (Abrahamson, 2004) leads them to take steps to maintain a social and 
cultural distance between the two categories. 
 
Similar polarising dynamics emerge in ‘Work, Consumerism and the New Poor’ 
(1998) and in ‘Community’ (2001).  The consumerism, of liquid modernity denigrates 
the welfare state, the child of solid modernity, for fostering dependency. In place of 
dependency consumer society valorises choice. The production line of solid 
modernity is replaced by the temple of conspicuous consumption and choice, the 
shopping mall; the work ethic is replaced by an aesthetic of consumption (Bauman, 
1998). In reality and despite the rhetoric of capitalism, however, not everyone can be 
a consumer. The poor are still with us but the poverty of the new poor is not 
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understood as a consequence of structural forces as in the period of welfare 
consensus. Rather it is indicative of their failure to take up the choices available to 
them in the marketplace; they are ‘flawed consumers’. 
 
Freedom within liquid modernity depends on a capacity to consume. But this capacity 
is tenuous; the spectre of poverty is its alter-ego, as global recession evidences only 
too starkly. In a consumer society the poor have little use any more; they are not 
required as producers and not up to the mark as consumers. Without the discipline of 
the work ethic the vagabonds and the new poor threaten the anxious existence of 
tourists and consumers. The threat they pose, or are imagined to pose, is cast into the 
realms of criminality through a proliferation of new laws and increasingly punitive 
criminal justice regimes (Bauman, 2004). Political rhetoric claims to want to include 
them but they are to be included only so long as they buy into the narrowing moral 
centre ground of consumer society (Levitas, 1998, Butler and Drakeford, 2001) and of 
course few can do so. ‘Inclusion’, thus, becomes a mode of social control. 
 
Criminalising the poor identifies them as the authors of their own misfortune;  
offending places them beyond the pale of decent society. Bauman (1993, 1998) calls 
this process adiaphorisation; ‘linking poverty to criminality helps to banish the poor 
from the realms of ordinary moral obligation’ (1998:77). Adiaphorisation neuters our 
moral responsibility, removing certain classified groups, the poor, the asylum seeker, 
the paedophile, the anti-social youth or neighbour from the sphere of moral concern. 
It masks the comfortable but anxious majority’s disengagement from a commitment 
and responsibility to those who do not conduct themselves ‘as we do’ (Blackshaw, 
2005). Generally, liquid modern society is characterised by fragmentation, 
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discontinuity and inconsequentiality (Bauman, 1994). That is the terrain on which 
social work operates and needs to come to terms with. In that respect hearkening back 
to a time when the profession seemed to be in a better place is unrealistic. It needs to 
adjust to the new order, but not to accept it. But first, perhaps, it needs to understand 
where it is in time, beginning with its genesis in the modern period. 
 
Social work in modernity 
While social work’s origins lie in religious traditions of care for the poor and the 
outcasts, modernity co-opted it to its consuming and unifying logic of human progress 
through the advance of science and reason: 
‘Born within the period of modernity...., social work began to take on the 
omniscient voice of science... with its emphasis on reductionist, logical positivist 
rationality, .... (It) took on this dominant discourse in the pursuit of status and 
professionalism. To this end we have seen codified systems of ethics, the move 
towards greater standardisation and competencies development, ... systems of 
accreditation (and) a proliferation of managerial and market discourses in 
welfare... (Sewpaul, 2005:211). 
 
Social welfare in the modern project can claim some massive achievements, foremost 
of which being the creation of the welfare state with its aim to destroy the five giants 
of want, disease, squalor, ignorance and idleness. Social work picked up and ran with 
some of these noble aspirations as epitomised in the UK in the hopes and ideals of 
foundational policy documents such as the Kilbrandon (1964) and Seebohm (1968) 
reports.  
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These hopes, however, were short-lived. As a child of modernity social work 
inherited its progenitor’s struggle to deal with ambivalence and its rational/emotional 
dualism. It came down on the side of the rational; social workers were not to be 
‘diverted by their personal beliefs and convictions or by emotions - sympathy or 
antipathy - to fellow workers or to individual clients ....’ . Actions ‘should not be 
oriented to persons at all, but to the rules, which specify procedure (Bauman, 1994: 
5). Such an orientation inevitably narrows the horizons of social work, for: 
 
‘When procedural execution takes over from moral assessment as the guide to 
job performance, one of the most conspicuous and seminal consequences is the 
urge to make the rules more precise and less ambiguous than they are, to taper 
the range of possible interpretations’ (Bauman, 2000). 
 
Thus, social work quickly became a narrow, municipal, bureaucratic activity obsessed 
with classification, categorising, assessing and labelling, seeking legitimacy for the 
use of such terms through claims to ‘evidence’, ‘best practice’, and increasingly to 
codified rules of practice and behaviour. More than anything, the task became de-
personalised. In Bauman’s terms this has the effect of effacing the face of social work 
clients, making them into a category and stripping them of their uniqueness and 
alterity. They are responded to as objects of intervention rather than as unique and 
moral persons to whom we are responsible out of an ontological call to care rather 
than by virtue of our professional duty. Duty-bound professionalism limits the help or 
care we offer by imposing (administrative and ‘professional’) intermediaries to that 
process. Rationality and moral purpose can point in opposing directions. 
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Social Work in Liquid Modernity 
 
The 1980s and 90s witnessed a retreat from welfare as neoliberal political and 
economic regimes spread across the developed world. Neoliberalism challenges ideas 
of the collective as embraced by the principles of the welfare state, valorising instead 
the primacy of the autonomous individual. This is framed within discourses of human 
rights and choice (Harvey, 2005). We have seen since the 1980s ‘a slow yet relentless 
dismantling or weakening of agencies which used to institutionalize commonality of 
fate and their replacement with institutions promoting the diversity of fate’ (Bauman 
1994: 20). In the UK the New Labour government elected in 1997 heralded in and 
provides an exemplar of Bauman’s notion of liquid modernity. The commonality of 
fate envisaged within welfare regimes was replaced by warmly persuasive but 
inherently individualising notion of ‘personalisation’ (Ferguson, 2007). 
Modernisation, another warmly persuasive word, became the watchword for the 
public services. This has involved a spirit of relentless change  ‘indeed obsessive and 
compulsive change (variously called ‘modernising’, ‘progress’, ‘improvement’, 
’development’, ‘updating’) (which) is the hard core of the modern way of being’ 
(Blackshaw, 2005:39). Social workers will be only too familiar with this spirit of 
obsessive, compulsive change. 
 
Social work in liquid modernity has been ruthlessly brought to heel, located in 
government thinking firmly as its agent within the consumer society. Changing Lives, 
the previous Scottish Executive’s review of social work states as much: ‘As 
demanding consumers of goods and services, users of social work services will 
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increasingly expect the same variety, choice and flexibility that they expect from the 
business sector’. (Scottish Executive, 2006:20). Any erstwhile dalliance with notions 
of social change were dispelled by Sam Galbraith the former Scottish Executive 
minister when he stated that, ‘Social work services are not about redressing the major 
injustices in our world. Their remit is not to battle with the major forces of social 
exclusion. It is to promote social inclusion for each individual within their 
circumstances’ (Community Care, 22 May 2000).  
 
The political positioning of social work within a rubric of global capitalism is again 
betrayed in Changing Lives in references to social workers helping ‘towards 
developing the economy, helping people to become self-reliant once more’ (p17). The 
Review also notes that political priorities will continue to be driven by fear of crime 
and anti-social behaviour ‘ (p. 21). The role of the social worker, by implication, is to 
buffer the comfortable but anxious majority from the excesses of the new poor. 
 
Liquid modern society positions social workers in other ways too. Like clients, they 
too are consumers; social work is no longer the vocation it might have been thought to 
be in solid modernity. A banal example of how the liquid modern mind can conceive 
of social work is provided in a recent advert for social workers in Scotland under the 
banner “socialclimber’. It featured a young, trendily-dressed woman who, despite her 
youthful appearance, seems to have had half a dozen social work jobs within as many 
years; including a lecturer post during which time she managed to write a couple of 
books! A serial social worker no less, reflecting liquid modernity’s sense of emptiness 
and impermanence. This of course has implications for the type of social work clients 
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can expect. As Bauman notes, The ‘flexible’ labour market neither offers nor permits 
commitment and dedication’ (1998:35).  
 
While differing in feel and emphasis, both solid and liquid imaginaries share, 
nevertheless, a recourse to bureaucracy to carry through their respective projects. The 
consequences of a bureaucratic mindset occupy the centre ground in Bauman’s 
thinking. 
Bureaucracy 
New Right political and economic thinking, which emerged over the 1980s and 90s, 
reinforced an obsession with order, effected through managerial approaches to 
practice and governance. Managerialism is a technical-rational doctrine concerned 
more with due process and outcome measurement rather than with any wider moral 
purpose. While the purported aim of managerial approaches to welfare was to free up 
services from a perceived dead-hand of bureaucracy, the neoliberal project is in fact 
shot-through with contradictions (Harvey, 2005). The state of perpetual revolution 
that neoliberalism envisages, where all that was solid melts to dust, induces a sense of 
insecurity. The response to this is obsessive measures of surveillance and information 
gathering. For all its talk of modernising public services New Labour has 
simultaneously presided over a massive increase in regulatory regimes (Humphrey, 
2003). In UK social work these are based around the various Care Councils, each with 
powers to formulate standards and inspect services against these and to register and 
discipline the social care workforce (McLaughlin, 2007). The workplace cultures that 
emerge from such regulatory impulses entrench bureaucratic ways of working and 
constrain individual initiative. 
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The mechanisms for the maintenance of managerialist agendas in liquid modern 
societies are insidious though; they depend on the one hand upon command and 
control edicts, but operating alongside this repressive aspect is another of seduction. 
Managerialism appeals to a common-sense view of the world, professing a 
‘globalising and imperialistic logic that proclaims itself as the universally applicable 
solution to the problems of efficiency, incompetence and chaos in the old ways of 
providing public services’ (Clarke, 1998: 174). And in many respects social work has 
been seduced into believing that solutions to complex social and moral questions can 
be reduced to bureaucratic fiat and regulatory apparatus.  
 
Bauman offers some telling insights into the role of bureaucracy in organisations and 
in wider cultures. He implicates modernity’s obsession with order and tidiness in the 
Holocaust (1989) arguing that the branch of the SS with the very ordinary title of 
Section of Administration and Economy ‘though engaged in mass murder on a 
gigantic scale, ... showed concern for correct bureaucratic procedure, for the niceties 
of precise definition, for the minutiae of bureaucratic regulation and the compliance 
with the law (1989:14). He goes on to say that the Holocaust epitomises principles of 
rationality - the final solution represents the ‘rational pursuit of efficient optimal goal-
implementation. It arose out of a genuinely rational concern, and it was generated by 
bureaucracy true to its form and purpose’ (1989: 17). The general accomplishment of 
the rationalisisng tendency Bauman argues, ‘has been solidified and institutionalized 
... in modern bureaucracy’ (1989:29). In social work, the faith placed in the possibility 
of some universal, standardized, rational end point to be arrived at through honing the 
bureaucratic machine is perhaps apparent in its pursuit of concepts such as ‘best 
practice’, ‘what works’ and ‘standards’ and increasing attempts to apply such 
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standards globally (Sewpaul, 2005). These end points, however, can only be arrived at 
by weeding-out other possibilities, denying context-specific realities, prioritizing a 
quest for bureaucratic efficiency over other considerations and sweeping aside the 
messy bits that are part and parcel of human encounters.  
 
Now it would be taking things too far to assert a moral equivalence between current-
day managerialism and the extermination of the Jews. This required a virulent, anti-
semitism. But anti-semitism alone could not bring about the resultant atrocities; its 
pathological ideology required the bureaucratic apparatus of the Nazi state to bring its 
project to a conclusion. But while modern day managerialism may not presage 
another Holocaust, parallels of smaller scale might be drawn. The combination of 
zealous but erroneous ideology and a belief that these might be advanced through 
bureaucratic fiat has been responsible for some of the less savoury episodes in social 
work’s recent past, such as the satanic ritual abuse (SRA) scares in the early 1990s. 
Proponents of SRA operated from positions of certainty and solidity whereas the 
realities of practice in arenas such as child protection are inevitably messy, ambiguous 
and contingent. Attempts to address ambivalence through control and mastery are 
both destined to fail and risk degenerating ‘into inhuman cruelty and oppression’ 
(Bauman, 1994: 36). Indeed, managerial approaches to child protection more 
generally are increasingly recognized as doing more harm than good, shattering 
families and communities (Lonne et al, 2008). 
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Social distance 
 
Atrocities in Nazi Germany were made possible through the imposition of a social 
distance between the Party functionaries and those Nazism sought to weed out from 
its vision of society, the Jews, homosexuals and trades unionists. One of Bauman’s 
most chilling observations is that the SS guards were not psychopaths but normal men 
and women going about their jobs to the best of their abilities. They were distanced 
from the objects of their work through the division of labour and extended chains of 
command, which acted to create distance and dissipate responsibility.  
 
A readiness to fulfil one’s duty, following procedures regardless of the content of the 
work one is told to perform is a prerequisite of a functioning bureaucracy. The 
bureaucratic mindset has a particular resonance in social work where extended line 
management arrangements are commonplace and responsibilities diffuse.  
 
‘In a large organisation most members do not even see (or hear of) the ultimate, 
remote and always oblique results which they help to materialise. So they may 
go on feeling moral and decent persons..., even while helping to commit the 
most gruesome cruelties’ (Bauman, 1994: 7).  
 
While perhaps reflecting Bauman’s capacity for exaggeration and flowery language 
the dynamic described here undoubtedly exists in, for instance, the decisions taken at 
headquarters level to deny a family with a severely disabled child the respite package 
they need. This decision is passed down from senior to front-line social worker who 
passes this on to the family as a fait accompli. The rules have been applied, the deed 
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done. And when done often and routinely enough it becomes a procedural duty shorn 
of emotional or moral sentiment. The most prominent emotion to be exiled in such 
cases is ‘that resilient and unruly ‘voice of conscience’ that may prompt one to help 
the sufferer and to abstain from causing suffering’ (Bauman, 1994: 6). 
 
A consequence of social distance is lack of moral responsibility. ‘Responsibility is 
silenced once proximity is eroded… the fellow human subject is transformed into an 
‘other’ by technical bureaucracy’ (Bauman,1989:184). Webb (2006) identifies the 
Pindown regime in English children’s homes where children were subject to 
oppressive restrictions on their freedom of movement as an example of what can 
happen when there is a lack of proximity in relationships and carers begin to think 
that caring can be reduced to a set of house rules to manage behaviours. The Pindown 
regime did not come about because its proponents were bad or uncaring people; it 
came about because they began to believe and were encouraged to believe that expert 
systems could take the place of personal relationships and personal responsibility in 
caring for children. 
 
Where does this leave social work? 
 
Most people still come into social work driven by a desire to do good (Cree and 
Davis, 2007). They are ground down by bureaucracy, managerialism and ever more 
intrusive attempts to impose technologies of categorisation, surveillance and control 
and by the depersonalization of the social work role. The consequences of this are 
manifest in a haemorrhaging of staff from the profession. Yet the seductive capacities 
of managerialism often prevent managers and practitioners from recognizing the root 
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cause of the problem and they seek solutions in more of the same; the rules aren’t 
working so what we need are more and better rules seems to be the refrain. The root 
problem is more fundamental. There are irreconcilable conceptual difficulties inherent 
in attempting to offer a caring and emancipatory social work within the conditions of 
modernity. Bauman argues that neither bureaucracy nor business, (reflecting solid and 
liquid modernity respectively) can deal with the moral concerns that are part and 
parcel of ‘being for’ the other. ‘Bureaucracy strangles or criminalises moral impulses, 
while business merely pushes them aside.’ (1994:13). Ethics in both are reduced to 
rules of conduct - in bureaucracy these are procedural, in business they are 
contractual. The consequence of this is that  
 
‘Rather than being emancipatory, the welfare services today constitute a second 
rate and repressive regime which have recourse to the expert and 
‘governmentalised’ gaze of those employed by the state, the DSS officer, the 
community development worker, the GP, the social worker, the probation officer 
and so forth, who collectively ‘police’ the ‘flawed consumers’ (Blackshaw, 
2005:127). 
 
A return to ethics 
 
While a reading of Bauman might lead to fairly pessimistic conclusions being drawn 
about the state of contemporary social work he also offers pointers to what is required 
to make things different. It is a tall order, demanding that dominant discourses are 
made to stutter. In essence social work needs to be reconceptualised as a moral rather 
than an instrumental task. Any emergent moral purpose needs to be rooted in the 
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person of the social worker rather than in abstract ethical or behavioural codes. In 
drawing us towards this conclusion, however, Bauman is not alone. A number of 
social work writers are beginning to identify the profession’s underpinning moral 
foundations. Webb, for instance, claims that: 
 
‘the legitimacy of social work rests on exhortations that betray an ethical intent 
rather than a set of empirical or outcome based possibilities…the return to ethics 
should be a major theme that characterises social work in the late modern 
scenario.’                                 (2006:8) 
 
Bauman is also going with the grain of moral philosophy where there is a general 
turning away from any hope of finding and applying abstract and universally 
applicable moral rules as posited by dominant Kantian perspectives and reified in 
rule-bound policy and practice cultures. Dissatisfaction with Kantian ethics is evident 
in the growing interest shown in other ethical approaches, such as feminist ethics of 
care (e.g. Tronto, 1993) and the resurgence of Aristotelian virtue ethics (Banks and 
Gallagher, 2009). Within such moral frameworks individuals have to reach moral 
decisions with both feet firmly in the real world of practice situations and 
relationships. 
 
Bauman’s own ethical writing is based on that of Emmanuel Levinas, perhaps 
France’s foremost philosopher of the 20th Century. Levinas turns modernity’s ethical 
tenets on their head. Descartes argued cogito ergo sum, ‘I think therefore I am’, 
providing an early assertion of the Enlightenment’s rootedness in rationality. Kant 
formulated his categorical imperative, introducing a calculating, contractual element 
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to our relationships with others - I am to do unto others and care for others out of duty 
and because one day I myself will need to be cared for and would hope to get back the 
same respect as I have demonstrated. For Levinas, ethics is neither rational nor 
calculating; he places ethics at the core of philosophy, identifying the moral impulse 
to reach out to the other as primary. We are to ‘be for’ the other. 
 
Levinas introduces the notion of ‘the face’, signifying not just the physical features 
but the entire being of the individual who confronts us and draws us to them. The face 
demands that we connect with it in a very immediate way, face to face, without 
intermediary. Our responsibility for that person is infinite and immediate. This 
contrasts with social work as it has developed where ‘the way in which power is 
imagined and exercised in late or liquid modernity is to the exclusion of any human 
contact at all’ (in Ferguson, 2004: 213). Face to face encounters/intimate relationships 
are mediated through an expanding array of policies, procedures, assumptions and, 
increasingly, technology. We call it professionalism and professional distance. 
 
Modernity’s dominant mode of relating to the ‘other’ is to make them like ‘self’, thus 
threatening their alterity with a totalitarianism of the same. Alterity for Levinas goes 
beyond difference. It encapsulates the absolute unknowability of the ‘other’. Although 
we are pulled to the ‘other’ we can never really know them; there remains a 
transcendence to our relationships. The way we seek to know them is to draw them 
into a normative frame, as exemplified in social work’s attempts to assess, categorise, 
and label. Ethically, this ‘murders’ their alterity. Levinas eschews any notion of 
reciprocity; care looks for nothing in return. A further departure from Kant comes in 
Levinas’ conception of freedom. In Kantian thinking the ultimate measure of human 
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existence is the autonomous, free-thinking, individual. For Levinas, freedom only 
comes in relationship with others, in heteronomy (community) rather than autonomy. 
 
Bauman’s moral writing is based upon this general Levinasian account. His use of 
ethics and morality can appear contradictory at times but generally he contrasts the 
two.  Ethics is an attempt to codify morality, or to set forth norms; morality is an 
orientation to the ‘other’. ‘Reality is messy and ambiguous, so moral decisions, unlike 
abstract moral principles are aporetic, that is irredeemably ambivalent and contingent 
(Bauman, 1993). A moral stance is personal but ‘it must also embrace the moral 
dimension of the public, social objectives that are pursued and choices that are made’ 
(Bauman, 1993: cited in Hugman, 2003a: 1035). This acknowledgement of the public 
and social dimensions involved in taking a moral stance perhaps resonates with 
emerging interest in Habermasian discourse ethics in social work (Houston, 2003, 
Lovat and Gray, 2008). It is in such spaces that the potentially idiosynchratic nature 
of purely personalized moral decisions might be reconciled with the public role of 
social workers. 
 
Bauman’s ethical thinking revolves around his identification of humans as 
‘ineluctably - existentially - moral beings’ (1995: 1). Dominant political and indeed 
professional perspectives on ethics, reified in approaches to governance based around 
rules and regulations, reflect an essentially misanthropic view of human nature. 
Essentially we need to have our baser instincts kept in check by layers of legal 
injunction and behavioural codes; we need rules to be moral. Bauman turns that on its 
head (1993) arguing that we are not moral thanks to society. Rather, society exists 
because individuals are moral; they have the capacity to take decisions and to act in 
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ways that are oriented to the ‘other’. To be moral is not necessarily to be either good 
or bad ‘but to exercise one’s freedom of authorship and/or actorship as a choice 
between good and evil’ (1994: 1). As moral beings we need to be aware of ‘the moral 
character of our choices: of our facing our choices more consciously and seeing their 
moral contents more clearly’ (1995: 7). The plethora of rules we are increasingly 
confronted with actually inhibit moral thought and action, encouraging us merely to 
abide by the rules. In that sense: 
 
Codified rules of what to do in particular cases and cases of like kind, gets us off 
the hook of moral endeavour…Adherence to codified rules does not necessarily 
require self-awareness or accountability for taking a moral stance. It simply 
requires learning the rules and following them… 
(Ricks and Bellefeuille, 2003:121) 
 
Bauman (1993) notes that people are capable of making moral choices and do so in 
small and large ways on a daily basis. Many social workers still make caring 
connections with and go the extra mile for those they work with although very often 
they do so in spite of rather than because of the organizational structures and 
assumptions that frame their work. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bauman’s work has relevance to social work in perhaps two main ways. Firstly it 
offers a lens through which to understand the ‘social’ at a time when atomizing 
agendas of individual rights and choice dominate. The ‘social’ landscape Bauman 
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paints demands that we cannot ignore issues of poverty, inequality and perhaps most 
of all exclusion. Secondly Bauman highlights a fundamental paradox in the way the 
profession is currently conceptualized and governed. What is undertaken under the 
banners of professionalisation, modernising, improvement, regulation or whatever 
zeitgeist term is employed will, by their nature, fail to deliver. Worse still, such 
initiatives compound the very difficulties they purport to address by treating social 
work as a technical-rational undertaking that is amenable to the usual rules of 
bureaucracy or business. Such rules and principles are in fact inimical to a conception 
of social work as a moral endeavour. 
 
What a truly ‘liquid’ social work might look like is perhaps the task for a further 
paper. However, we can offer some pointers. If social work is, ultimately, conceived 
of as a moral endeavour then attempts to render it rational cannot but fail for, 
‘Morality is endemically and irredeemably non-rational - in the sense of not being 
calculable, hence not being presentable as following impersonal rules’ (Bauman, 
1993:60). Morality then can’t be defined in codes of conduct or sets of abstract rules. 
Merely following rules or procedures gets us off the hook of proper moral endeavour. 
 Morality needs to be grounded and demonstrated within relationships and through 
moral comportment within these. This calls for reflexive practitioners prepared to 
listen to that unruly voice of conscience and to break the rules when those rules do not 
facilitate a ‘being for’ those they work with. There is no rule-book that tells us how to 
go about this. ‘For the ethical world... ambivalence and uncertainty are its daily bread 
and cannot be stamped out without destroying the moral substance of 
responsibility…” (Bauman 2000: 10).  
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There are all too apparent challenges in practicing ‘liquid’ social work within political 
and agency cultures that, in their response to insecurity, become ever more solid. 
Being morally active carries risks to reputation and ultimately job security within 
foreclosing practice cultures. However, in order to retain or reclaim any ontological 
purpose social work and social workers need to become open to different possibilities, 
to the articulation of diverse and contrary discourses, to give up on the quest for some 
elusive ‘best practice’ and to become comfortable with uncertainty; in short to 
become reflexive and morally active practitioners. Perhaps, now, more than ever 
social work requires such morally active practitioners prepared to step into 
uncertainty and to challenge the ruling ideas that have not served social work well. 
 
 
My thanks are due to Mike Nellis for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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